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작성일 : 17-01-04 08:12
반기문씨 대통령 후보로 나와도 괜찮은거에요?
 글쓴이 : 서냥
조회 : 941  


제가 알기론 UN 사무총장 업무의 공공성을 기하기 위해서 퇴임후에는 자국에서 행정부 관련 업무를 맡지 않는게 원칙이라던데 퇴임하자마자 대통령 막되고 이러면 앞으로 UN 사무총장도 자국이익을 위해서 일할 가능성을 열어놓게 되는거 아닌가요?

UN 사무총장씩이나 한 사람이 UN의 권위를 떨어뜨리는 일인거 같은데...

출처 : 해외 네티즌 반응 - 가생이닷컴https://www.gasengi.com
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알림:공격적인 댓글이나 욕설, 인종차별적인 글, 무분별한 특정국가 비난글등 절대 삼가 바랍니다.
하이1004 17-01-04 08:22
   
그게또 강제성이 없는지라.... 그냥 권고사항... 그래도 하나만 봐도 열을 알수 있다고 하는데 그거 하나만 봐도 좋게는 안보이는게 현실이네요...
wndtlk 17-01-04 08:51
   
It is desirable that no Member should offer [the Secretary-General], at any rate immediately on retirement, any governmental position,” states Resolution 11 (I), adding that “on his part a Secretary-General should refrain from accepting any such position 이라는 문구인데 바람직하다는 권고사항인데다가  퇴임직후가 언제까지라는 규정이 없습니다.
19대 대통령의 취임일은 2018.2.25일이고 유엔사무총장 퇴임후 1년 1개월 25일 이후네요.
퇴임직후가 언제까지인가요?
     
로니aa 17-01-04 09:17
   
UN에서 알수있는 각국 기밀들이 무용지물이 되는 때로 보통 4년이상이라고 보는게 일반적입니다. 국제법시간에 배웠는데 10년이라고 주장하는 사람들도 있다고.

이미 8년전에 들은 수업이라 지금은 어떻게 보는지는 잘 모르겠지만

그 권고사항의 취지가 유엔총장이 알수있는 '각 국가의 기밀이 무용지물이 되는 때'가 일반론인듯.
          
wndtlk 17-01-04 10:12
   
한국 대통령이 타국의 국가기밀을 알고 있는 것이 한국에 유리하면 유리했지 나쁠 이유가 있나요?
한국에 유리할까봐 권고사항을 따른다는 것도 이상합니다. 권고사항이고 1년 이후라 그렇게 타국이 못마땅하게 생각할지는 몰라도 실질적으로 반발할 논리도 없어 보입니다.
               
서냥 17-01-04 11:16
   
본문에 언급한대로 UN 사무총장이 앞으로 자국이익을 위해서 활동하게 되면 안그래도 유명무실해져가는 UN은 권위는 더 추락할테고 국제기구로써의 공정성을 상실하게 될텐데 사무총장씩이나 한분이 그렇게 해도 괜찮은가 하는 말이에요

자국이익을 위해서라면 도덕성마저 내팽개쳐도 상관없다는 논리는 미국, 중국, 러시아 같은 땅떵이도 엄청 크고 인구도 많은 초강대국이나 할 논리이지 우리같이 땅도 적고 인구도 적은 나라가 취할 생존전략이 아닌거 같군요~ 장기적으로 봐서 UN같은 국제기구의 유명무실화는 우려할만한 일이 될듯
               
aromi81 17-01-04 14:05
   
아무리 기름장어 똥구멍을 빨고 싶어도 상식은 탑재하고 빨자
               
비오는새벽 17-01-04 14:38
   
너무 억지논리~
wndtlk 17-01-12 02:29
   
resolution 11과  2270의 문장의 강도를 읽어보세요.
desirable과 condemn의 차이는 무엇인가요?

UN resolution 11
It is desirable that no Member should offer [the Secretary-General], at any rate immediately on retirement, any governmental position,” states Resolution 11 (I), adding that “on his part a Secretary-General should refrain from accepting any such position

UN Resolution 2270 (2016):
Condemns the DPRK’s January 6 nuclear test and February 7 launch;
Reaffirms the DPRK’s obligations not to conduct any further launches using ballistic missile technology or nuclear tests, and abandon all nuclear weapons, suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and abandon all other WMD programs;
Clarifies a ban on technical cooperation with the DPRK on launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite or space launch;
Imposes measures to constrain the DPRK’s conventional arms capabilities:
Tightens the arms embargo to prohibit the transfer of small arms and light weapons to the DPRK;
Closes a loophole that could have allowed the temporary transfer of arms for “repair”;
Creates a new conventional arms “catch-all” provision to ban the transfer of any item – even if not covered by the arms embargo – except food or medicine that could directly contribute to the operational capabilities of the DPRK’s armed forces or the transfer by the DPRK of any item that directly contributes to operational capabilities of the armed forces of another Member State outside the DPRK;
Clarifies that existing UN Security Council resolutions ban hosting of DPRK trainers or advisors, or other officials for military, paramilitary, or police training;
Affirms that existing UN asset freezes apply to vessels;
Targets the DPRK’s proliferation networks to limit the DPRK’s ability to smuggle and evade sanctions:
Requires states to expel DPRK diplomats engaged in activities prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions;
Requires states to expel foreign nationals involved in DPRK-related, UN-prohibited activities;
Requires states to close offices of designated entities and expel their representatives;
Highlights for states the risk of DPRK front companies;
Bans specialized teaching or training for DPRK nationals in fields, such as advanced physics, aerospace engineering, and advanced computer simulation, that could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation-sensitive activities;
Imposes new cargo inspection and maritime procedures to limit the DPRK’s ability to transfer UN-prohibited items:
Requires States to inspect cargo to/from the DPRK or brokered by the DPRK that is within or transiting their territories (i.e., a mandatory cargo inspection regime);
Requires States to ban DPRK chartering of vessels or aircraft (with an exemption if States notify the DPRK Sanctions Committee in advance that such activities are exclusively for livelihood purposes that will not generate revenue for DPRK individuals or entities);
Requires States to prohibit their nationals from operating DPRK vessels or using DPRK flags (with an exemption if States notify the DPRK Sanctions Committee in advance that such activities are for exclusively for livelihood purposes that will not generate revenue for DPRK individuals or entities);
Bans flights of any plane suspected of carrying prohibited items;
Prohibits port calls by any vessel controlled by a designated entity or suspected of engaging in activity prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK;
Obligates the DPRK to act in accordance with its obligations as a State Party to the Convention on Biological Weapons and calls upon the DPRK to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention;
Updates the current list of chemical- and biological-warfare items banned for transfer to/from the DPRK (with annual updates) and calls for the list to be further updated annually;
Directs the Security Council’s DPRK Sanctions Committee to update within fifteen days an additional list of prohibited nuclear/missile/chem-bio items banned for transfer to/from the DPRK;
Prohibits the transfer of dual-use nuclear/missile items through a binding Weapons of Mass Destruction “catch-all” provision and updates previous “seize and dispose” obligations;
Imposes sectoral sanctions targeting the DPRK’s trade in resources:
Bans exports from the DPRK of coal, iron, and iron ore, unless such transactions are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear/missile programs or other activities that constitute UN Security Council resolution violations;
Bans exports from the DPRK of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals;
Bans transfers of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel, to the DPRK;
Imposes new financial sanctions targeting DPRK banks and assets.
Requires States to freeze the assets of entities of the Government of the DPRK or Worker’s Party of Korea determined to be associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or missile programs or other activities that constitute violations of UN Security Council resolutions;
Requires States to prohibit DPRK banks from opening branches in their territory or engaging in certain correspondent relationships with these banks;
Requires States to prohibit their financial institutions from opening new representative offices or subsidiaries, branches, or banking accounts in the DPRK;
Requires States to close existing representative offices or subsidiaries, branches, or banking accounts in the DPRK if reasonable grounds exist to believe such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or missile programs or UNSCR violations;
Prohibits all public or private financial support for trade with the DPRK, including export credits, guarantees, and insurance, if such support could contribute reasonable grounds to believe there is a link to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities that constitute UNSCR violations;
Highlights the risk that the DPRK can use gold to evade sanctions;
Urges states to apply Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations to effectively implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation;
Provides an illustrative list of specific luxury goods that are banned for transfer to the DPRK.
Provides new sanctions implementation tools, including new requirements for the DPRK Sanctions Committee to improve enforcement, such as regularly updating the names of front companies and aliases on the Committee's sanctions list.
Underlines that these measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences;
Reiterates the importance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia; reaffirms support to the Six-Party Talks and calls for their resumption; and reiterates support for the 2005 Joint- Statement commitments; and
Expresses the Council’s determination to take further significant measures in the event of further DPRK nuclear tests or launches.
The UNSCR also includes sanctions annexes that:

1.Identify 16 individuals designated for targeted sanctions (asset freeze/travel ban);

2.Identify 12 entities (including government agencies and banks) designated for an asset freeze;

3.Specify 31 vessels controlled by UN-designated Ocean Maritime Management (i.e., vessels that must be impounded); and

4.Provide 4 illustrative categories of luxury goods for the purposes of implementing the UNSCR 1718 luxury goods ban.